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Abstract
In this paper, we examine capital account openness
and exchange rate 
exibility in 11 Asian countries. Asia
has made slow progress on de jure capital account open-
ness, but has made much more progress on de facto cap-
ital account openness. While there is a slow pace of in-
crease in exchange rate 
exibility, most Asian countries
continue to have largely in
exible exchange rates. This
combination { of moving forward with de facto capital
account integration without bringing in exchange rate

exibility { has lead to procyclicality of monetary policy
when capital 
ows are procyclical. The paper empha-
sises the case for a consistent monetary policy frame-
work.
This paper was presented at the ADBI conference on \Macroeconomic
Policy Issues" on 28-29 July 2009 in Tokyo. We are grateful to Shinji Takagi
and Kenji Aramaki for comments. We thank Vimal Balasubramaniam and
Anmol Sethy for able research assistance.This work was done under the
aegis of the NIPFP-DEA Research Program.
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21 Introduction
A core idea in modern macroeconomics is the `impossible trin-
ity', the notion that a country can have only two of an open
capital account, a xed exchange rate and autonomy of mone-
tary policy. By and large, industrial countries have chosen con-
sistent frameworks in the light of the impossible trinity. Most
countries have an open capital account, 
oating exchange rate
and an autonomous monetary policy, other than the countries of
Eurozone which have an open capital account, a xed exchange
rate, and no autonomous monetary policy.
In Asia, there are a few polar examples like Hong Kong, which
has a xed exchange rate, an open capital account, and no mone-
tary policy autonomy. But most Asian countries have not chosen
a well specied monetary policy framework. Most countries have
opted for a combination of certain capital controls and exchange
rate in
exibility. This raises interesting questions in understand-
ing Asia, and in thinking about the evolution of policy in the
future. It emphasises the need for a consistent monetary policy
framework.
In this paper, we focus on the 11 major Asian countries: India,
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, In-
donesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Korea. This is a highly het-
erogeneous group. It ranges from city-states like Singapore to
giants like China. It ranges from poor countries like India to
rich countries like Taiwan or Korea. We term these countries
the Asia-11.
We examine where Asia-11 stand with respect to the three cor-
ners of the impossible trinity: capital controls, exchange rate
regime and monetary policy autonomy. We obtain summary
statistics about the countries, and also focus on numerical val-
ues for three countries { India, China and Korea.
In this paper, we focus on the de facto rather than the de jure.
3De jure capital controls, the de jure exchange rate regime, the
de jure monetary policy framework,often dier from the de facto
regimes. etc. However, at the same time, countries often fail to
do as they say. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on de
facto conditions for capital account openness and the exchange
rate regime, and its consequences for monetary policy as mea-
sured by the short-term interest rate expressed in real terms.
We nd that while Asia has experienced some de jure capital
account liberalisation, in most countries restrictions on capital

ows are still in place. However, this has not impeded a substan-
tial extent and a continuing pace of capital account integration
at a de facto level, assisted by a growing sophistication of the
nancial system.
Alongside this, Asia is characterised by substantial exchange
rate in
exibility. While exchange rate 
exibility has increased
after 2000, it remains low by world standards. The most 
exible
exchange rate { that of Korea { lags 
oating exchange rates.
Counter-cyclical policy is one of the strategies through which
monetary policy achieves objectives of stabilising in
ation and
output. We focus on this objective of monetary policy in the
context of the inconsistencies arising from the impossible trin-
ity. Today most of Asia is in an environment with growing
de facto capital account integration while having substantial de
facto exchange rate in
exibility. The extent that capital 
ows
are procyclical, the currency trading of central banks will con-
vert the procyclicality of capital 
ows into procyclicality of mon-
etary policy. China and India are interesting test cases of these
phenomena, given a limited extent of de facto capital account
opening and relatively weak nancial systems. Yet, even with
these two countries, we argue that monetary policy has been
fairly procyclical.
We also argue that there is a potential for diculties, with coun-
tries which have moved towards substantial de facto integration
while continuing to have limited exchange rate 
exibility. This
4is particularly a concern with Malaysia and Taiwan, which com-
bine (a) sophisticated nancial systems, which erode the eec-
tiveness of capital controls, (b) substantial de facto openness
and (c) rigidity of the exchange rate. As diculties in pursu-
ing an counter cyclical monetary policy increase when countries
with pegged exchange rates witness procyclical capital 
ows, the
paper makes a case for a consistent monetary policy framework.
2 Capital controls
2.1 De jure controls: the Chinn-Ito database
We start with a description of the de jure capital controls in
place in Asian economies compared to the rest of the world.Chinn
and Ito (2008) have constructed a database about the de jure
capital controls prevalent in a country, based on a principal com-
ponents analysis of the information supplied by countries to the
IMF's arear database. This yields a score for each country for
each year. The values range from -1.81 for completely closed
countries to +2.53 for completely open countries.
As an example, France, which was one of the last industrial
countries to open up, went from a value of -1.27 in 1970 to a
value of 2.53 in 1995. In another example, Israel shifted from a
value of -1.13 in 1997 to 2.53 in 2004.
While this database is often used for an analysis of de jure cap-
ital controls, it important to point out that it does not capture
easing of capital controls adequately since it contintues to give
the same score unless all restrictions are removed. Further, the
index rose signicantly for most industrial countries in recent
years, as they introduced prudential measures related to anti-
money laundering, anti-terrorist nancing, and the like. There-
fore, the denition has changed 1.
1We are grateful to Shinji Takagi for pointing this out.
5Figure 1 Density of the Chinn-Ito measure across all countries:
comparing 1970 vs. 2007
This graph shows the kernel density estimator of the cross-sectional distri-
bution of the Chinn-Ito measure of de jure capital account openness. The
blue line shows conditions in 1970 and the red line shows conditions in 2007.
Both distributions are bimodal, with a clump of countries which are mostly
open and a clump of countries which are mostly closed. There has been a
strong shift of probability mass from the left hump (mostly closed) to the
right hump (mostly open). This graph gives us a frame of reference for
interpreting information from the Chinn-Ito database about Asia.
































6This database shows that over the years, a substantial scale of
capital account decontrol has taken place worldwide. Figure 1
shows the kernel density plot of the Chinn-Ito measure across all
countries. In both years, the density is bimodal, with a cluster
of countries with largely open capital accounts and a cluster of
countries with largely closed capital accounts. This graphically
conveys the shift of many countries away from being mostly
closed to being mostly open. The 1970 distribution has a sharp
bump around a score of -1. This bump has sharply come down
by 2007. Now there is a roughly even number of countries which
have high openness when compared with the countries which
have low openness.
The Chinn-Ito database has information for all the Asia-11 coun-
tries other than Taiwan. Since Taiwan largely has capital ac-
count convertibility, our information about Asia-11 drawn from
this database is somewhat biased in the downward direction.
Figure 2 shows the time-series of the average value of the Chinn-
Ito measure for Asia-11 ex Taiwan, and compares these against
the average value for the world. At the starting point and the
endpoint, the de jure controls in Asia-11 were similar to the
world average, However, there was an intermediate period where
decontrol for Asia-11 had advanced more than the world aver-
age. While countries promoted long term capital 
ows like FDI,
some of them put restrictions on short term 
ows. One example
is India which imposed restrictions on short term debt.
Table 1 shows numerical values for India, China, Korea and the
Asian average. China and India were at the value of -1.13 all
through. Korea had moved forward to liberalisation, with a
value of -0.09 in 1995. In the Asian crisis, Korea dropped back
to -1.13 from 1996 till 2000. From 2001 onwards, Korea got back
to liberalising the capital account, achieving a value of 0.18 in
2007. At the same time, Korea greatly lags the capital account
openness of other OECD countries.
The average openness of the Asia-11 had risen sharply from -
7Figure 2 Evolution of the average Chinn-Ito measure for the
Asia-11
The average value of the Chinn-Ito measure across countries is shown for
each year computed. The black line shows the average for the whole world,
and the grey line shows the average for Asia.
This suggests that in recent years, average de jure controls in Asia are
similar to the world average. This reverses the relationship which prevailed
in previous decades, where Asia was (on average) more open than the world
average.
































8Table 1 Evolution of the Chinn-Ito measure
This table focuses on India, China and Korea, and shows the evolution of
the Chinn-Ito measure of these three countries as compared with the Asian
mean.
Both India and China have a value of -1.13 throughout, which corresponds
to the `mostly closed' mode of the density graph seen in Figure 1. In Korea's
case, de jure capital controls have changed several times. In the aftermath
of the Asian Crisis, Korea was also at -1.13 till 2000. From there, Korea
has engaged in considerable de jure capital account liberalisation, going up
to a value of 0.18 in 2007.
The average for Asia-11 shows a peak value of 0.96 in 1985 and in 1995.
Compared with that, Asia is more closed in 2007, with a value of 0.36
(which is still more open than India, China and Korea).
Year India China Korea Asia-11 mean
1970 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -0.07
1975 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.12
1980 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.45
1985 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.96
1990 -1.13 -1.81 -0.09 0.74
1995 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.96
1996 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.76
1997 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.56
1998 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.41
1999 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.56
2000 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 0.49
2001 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.49
2002 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.49
2003 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.49
2004 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.49
2005 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.49
2006 -1.13 -1.13 -0.09 0.49
2007 -1.13 -1.13 0.18 0.36
Change 2000-2007 0 0 +1.31 -0.13
90.07 in 1970 (where it was ahead of China and India in 2007)
to 0.96 in 1985. After the Asian crisis, de jure controls resur-
faced; the average score dropped to 0.41 in 1998. The pre-crisis
value of 0.96 has not been restored until 2007. However, beca-
sue of the change in denition, because of factors such as money
laundering, as well as the inability of the measure to capture
easing in controls that do not mean a complete removal of re-
strictions, some of the progress made by Asian countries in de
jure openness in recent years is likely not being picked up by the
the Chinn-Ito measure.
2.2 De facto capital account openness
2.2.1 Evidence from gross 
ows to GDP
The familiar trade/GDP ratio is dened as the sum of imports
and exports, expressed as percent of GDP. This measures trade
openness. A simple extension of this idea is the ratio of gross
cross border nancial 
ows on the BOP to GDP. This measures
nancial integration. The ability of the central bank to in
u-
ence the exchange rate depends on the volume of cross border

ows occurring on foreign exchange markets. Even when trans-
actions net out over the year, on a daily basis import payments,
export earnings and nancial 
ows in
uence the exchange rate.
In addition, while gross 
ows comprise both current account
and capital account transactions, bigger current account trans-
actions can imply greater capital account openness owing to the
cross-border transfers of capital through possible trade misin-
voicing. Patnaik et al. (2009) shows that greater trade misin-
voicing occurs when the current account is bigger and acts as
a mechanism to circumvent capital controls. As an example
of the unexpected de facto capital account integration which
comes about once multinational corporations play a substantial
role in the economy, see Patnaik and Shah (2009 (forthcoming).
Another literature that is linked to these ideas emphasises the
10Figure 3 Average value of gross 
ows to GDP for Asia-11
This graph focuses on gross 
ows to GDP { expressed as a ratio { as a
measure of gloablisation. A value of 1 corresponds to gross 
ows in a year
which are 100% of GDP in a year.
At each year, two location estimators (the mean and the median) of the
values for Asia-11 countries are reported. Both show a considerable pace
of integration into the world economy.








































two-way links between openness on the current account and the
capital account (Aizenman, 2003; Aizenman and Noy, 2004).
We therefore look at gross 
ows on both the trade and capital
account as a measure of globalisation of an economy.This takes
both trade and nancial integration into account.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the time-series of this measure
of globalisation for the Asia-11, excluding Vietnam where data
was not available. The median openness went up from roughly
100% of GDP in 1998 to roughly 160% of GDP in 2008. The
average shows bigger values, because it is pushed up by very
large values seen for small highly open countries like Singapore
and Hong Kong.
Table 2 looks closer at individual countries. Both China and
India had a slow pace of change until roughly 2000, after which
the rate of change of integration went up. In India's case, from
2000 to 2008, there was a rise of 56 percentage points of GDP.
11Table 2 Gross 
ows to GDP for India, China and Korea
This table reports values for India, China and Korea, and the Asia-11
mean, for gross 
ows to GDP, a measure of global integration. A value of
1 corresponds to gross 
ows in a year which are 100% of GDP in a year.
This shows a rise of 56 percentage points from 2000 to 2008 for India; a rise
of 30 percentage points for China; a rise of 69 percentage points for Korea
and a rise of 45 percentage points for the average country.
Year India China Korea Mean for Asia-11
1998 0.44 0.48 0.85 1.52
1999 0.47 0.49 0.85 1.64
2000 0.56 0.58 1.00 1.79
2001 0.50 0.54 0.92 1.67
2002 0.53 0.56 0.76 1.63
2003 0.60 0.66 0.87 1.77
2004 0.68 0.75 0.89 1.94
2005 0.82 0.84 0.94 2.04
2006 1.00 0.89 1.01 2.16
2007 1.19 0.88 1.15 2.19
2008 1.12 0.88 1.69 2.24
Change 2000-2008 +0.56 +0.30 +0.69 +0.45
12Similar values were observed with China (30 percentage points
of GDP), Korea (69 percentage points of GDP) and the Asia-11
average (45 percentage points of GDP).
This evidence suggests that while Asia might be a reluctant
liberaliser when it comes to de jure controls, there has been a
rapid pace of integrating into the world economy, de facto.
2.2.2 Financial sector development
The extent to which capital controls are eective has a lot to do
with domestic nancial sector development. When the nancial
system is sophisticated, over time, the eectiveness of capital
controls tends to be eroded. Hence, when thinking about the
eectiveness of de jure capital controls, it is important to look
at the capability of the domestic nancial system.
In order to achieve this, we turn to Dorrucci et al. (2009), who
have developed a database oering panel data about nancial
sector development in 26 emerging economies. This covers all
the Asia-11 countries of interest in this paper, other than Viet-
nam. The values of this index range from 0 (undeveloped do-
mestic nancial system) to 1 (highly capable domestic nancial
system). We focus on their `narrow' measure owing to adequacy
of frequency of updation.
Figure 4 shows the time-series of the mean and median of the
score for the 10 countries of Asia where Dorrucci et al. (2009)
have information. In both cases, we see signicant sophistica-
tion of the nancial system having built up prior to the Asian
crisis, followed by a period of decline. From 2000 onwards, both
measures of location show an upward trend.
Table 3 shows numerical values for this measure in India, China,
Korea compared with the Asia-11 mean. The highest value for
the Asia-11 mean was 0.55 in 1995. In the aftermath of the Asian
crisis, this dropped to a low of 0.45 in 2000. After this, Asia-
13Figure 4 Average value of Dorrucci et. al. measure of nancial
sector development of the Asia-11
Dorrucci et al. (2009) report a measure of nancial sector development
across many countries for many years. This gure reports two location
estimators (the mean and the median) for the Asia-11 countries over the
years.
There was a striking decline in nancial sector capability in the aftermath








































14Table 3 Measure of nancial system capability
Dorrucci et al. (2009) report a measure of nancial sector development
across many countries for many years. This table reports values for India,
China, Korea and the Asia-11 mean.
In absolute terms, even advanced Asia (i.e. Korea) has values like 0.6 and
considerably lags the best values seen in OECD countries like the UK. India
and China considerably lag the Asian mean. In all cases, there is a positive
but modest pace of change over the 2000-2006 period.
Year India China Korea Asia-11 Mean
1991 0.28 0.65 0.50
1995 0.34 0.47 0.64 0.55
1996 0.34 0.45 0.65 0.54
1997 0.34 0.41 0.62 0.53
1998 0.33 0.42 0.57 0.46
1999 0.34 0.40 0.61 0.47
2000 0.34 0.38 0.57 0.45
2001 0.32 0.41 0.63 0.46
2002 0.32 0.42 0.62 0.48
2003 0.32 0.44 0.62 0.49
2004 0.35 0.43 0.58 0.49
2005 0.36 0.43 0.58 0.50
2006 0.39 0.43 0.60 0.51
Change 2000-2006 +0.05 +0.05 +0.03 +0.06
1511 has got back into nancial sector development, achieving an
average value of 0.51 in 2006.
This evidence suggests that de jure controls are likely to have
been more eective in the period from 1998 to 2004, where the
average score of nancial system capability was at low values,
when compared with the environment before or after this period.
2.2.3 Evidence from the Lane & Milesi-Ferretti database
The second methodology for measurement of de facto integra-
tion into the world economy is based on the database from Lane
& Milesi-Ferretti (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). This mea-
sures the stock of foreign assets and liabilities in the country, by
cumulating up the 
ows on the BOP. This is a valuable database
in that it measures the outcomes of a system of capital controls
as seen on the BOP. At the same time, it does not measure
capital 
ows that take place through mechanisms such as trade
misinvoicing, which involve evasion of capital controls and are
not recorded on the BOP.
This database shows that over the years, a substantial scale of
capital account de facto decontrol has taken place worldwide.
Figure 5 shows the kernel density plot of the Lane-Milesi Ferreti
measure across all countries. Unlike in Figure 1, the density of
de facto openness is not bimodal. This graphically conveys that
all economies have moved signicantly from closed capital ac-
counts to varied levels of open capital accounts. Further, there
is no congregation of countries at one level of openness, suggest-
ing that there is no broad understanding of the "appropriate"
level of openness. Countries that have de facto opened up have
continued to open up in a rapid pace.
Figure 6 shows the time-series of the average value of Asia-11
by this measure. The last year for which this data is observed
was 2004. The rapid changes of recent years are, hence, missed
out. As with the information presented in Figure 3, the sample
16Figure 5 Density of the Lane-Milesi Ferreti measure across all
countries: comparing 1970 vs. 2007
This graph shows the kernel density estimator of the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of the Lane-Milesi Ferreti measure of de facto capital account
openness. The black line shows conditions in 1970 and the grey line shows
conditions in 2007.
The distributions, unlike Chinn-Ito in Figure 1 are not bimodal, with most
countries being largely closed in 1970 and all countries opening rapidly in
2007. There has been a strong shift of probability mass from the left hump
(mostlyclosed) into a long tail of openness. This graph gives us the frame of
reference for interpreting information from the Lane-Milesi Ferreti database
about Asia.























17Figure 6 Average value for Asia-11 of Lane & Milesi-Ferretti
measure of de facto integration
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) have a database measuring the external
assets and liabilities of countries, expressed as a ratio to GDP. The gure
reports two location estimators (the mean and the median) for Asia-11
across time. While the mean value has risen sharply, the median has not.
This suggests a small group of countries which are strongly integrating into
the world economy while others are not.





































18Table 4 Lane & Milesi-Ferretti measure
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) have a database measuring the external
assets and liabilities of countries, expressed as a ratio to GDP. While the
Asia-11 mean shows a value in 2007 of 507% of GDP, this partly re
ects
the highly open small countries.
In the case of India, China and Korea, more modest values of 85%, 113%
and 135% of GDP are seen in 2007. In all cases, the change from 2000 to
2007 is one of strong increases in international economic integration, with
changes of 43%, 28%, 56% and 187% of GDP.
Year India China Korea Asia-11 mean
1997 0.39 0.72 0.57 2.62
1998 0.41 0.77 1.02 2.98
1999 0.41 0.82 0.97 3.33
2000 0.42 0.85 0.79 3.20
2001 0.44 0.88 0.90 3.23
2002 0.49 0.92 0.88 3.15
2003 0.55 0.99 0.97 3.53
2004 0.58 1.03 1.06 3.73
2005 0.57 0.93 1.09 3.74
2006 0.71 1.07 1.18 4.27
2007 0.85 1.13 1.35 5.07
Change 2000-2007 +0.43 +0.28 +0.56 +1.87
mean is pushed upwards owing to the presence of a few small
countries which are very open. The median is a better measure
of location. The time-series of the median shows relatively little
change after 2000.
Turning to specic countries, Table 4 shows a signicant pace
of de facto integration by India, China and Korea after 2000.
The change in seven years was 43, 28 and 56 percentage points
of GDP respectively.
193 Exchange rate regime
3.1 Methodology
In the last decade, the literature has revealed that the de jure
exchange rate regime in operation in many countries that is an-
nounced by the central bank diers from the de facto regime in
operation. This has motivated a small literature on data-driven
methods for the classication of exchange rate regimes (Reinhart
and Rogo, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; Calvo
and Reinhart, 2002a). This literature has attempted to create
datasets identifying the exchange rate regime in operation for all
countries in recent decades, using a variety of alternative algo-
rithms. While these databases are useful for many applications,
they have limited usefulness in measuring the ne structure of
intermediate regimes. As an example, the Reinhart and Ro-
go classication sees the Indian rupee as a single exchange rate
regime from 1993 onwards. As the evidence ahead shows, there
is a ne structure in the post-1993 period which yields fresh
insights into the causes and consequences of the exchange rate
regime and monetary policy framework.
A valuable tool for understanding the de facto exchange rate
regime in operation is a linear regression model based on cross-
currency exchange rates (with respect to a suitable numeraire).
Used at least since Haldane and Hall (1991), this model was
popularized by Frankel and Wei (1994) (and is hence also called
Frankel-Wei model). Recent applications of this estimation strat-
egy include B enassy-Qu er e et al. (2006), Shah et al. (2005) and
Frankel and Wei (2007). In this approach, an independent cur-
rency, such as the Swiss Franc (CHF), is chosen as an arbitrary
`numeraire'. If estimation involving the Indian rupee (INR) is


















20This regression picks up the extent to which the INR/CHF rate

uctuates in response to 
uctuations in the USD/CHF rate. If
there is pegging to the USD, then 
uctuations in the JPY and
DEM will be zero. If there is no pegging, then all the three
betas will be dierent from 0. The R2 of this regression is also
of interest; values near 1 would suggest reduced exchange rate

exibility.
To understand the de facto exchange rate regime in a given
country in a given time period, researchers and practitioners can
easily t this regression model to a given data window, or use
rolling data windows. However, such a strategy lacks a formal
inferential framework for determining changes in the regimes.
This has motivated an extension of the econometrics of struc-
tural change for the purpose of analysing structural change in
the Frankel-Wei model (Zeileis et al., 2008). This involves ex-
tending the familiar Perron-Bai methodology (Bai and Perron,
2003) for identifying the dates of structural change in an OLS
regression. Through this, dates of structural change in the ex-
change rate regime are identied. We focus on the period after
1976, and utilise weekly changes in exchange rates for these es-
timations. Values shown in brackets are t statistics.
For each country, a set of sub-periods are identied. In each sub-
period, the regression R2 serves as a summary statistic about ex-
change rate 
exibility. Values near 1 convey tight pegs. Floating
rates prove to have values of 0.4 to 0.5.
Using this classication scheme we are able to do the following:
 We are able to measure and quantify the ne structure
of intermediate regimes, with a real-valued measure of ex-
change rate in
exibility, the regression R2, which natu-
rally suggests a real-valued measure of exchange 
exibility,
1   R2.
 Sharp dates are obtained, at which the exchange rate regime
changed. We implement these methods using weekly per-
21centage changes of exchange rates, which yields break dates
to the resolution of the week. Through this, for each coun-
try, a time-series of exchange rate 
exibility is obtained,
of the value of the R2 which prevailed at a point in time.
 The number of breaks and the placement of breaks is based
on sound inference procedures.
3.2 Evidence on exchange rate 
exibility of
Asia-11
We apply this methodology to understanding the de facto ex-
change rate regime of each of the Asia-11 countries. Through
this, for each country, a time-series of the currency 
exibility is
obtained. This leads to summary statistics about exchange rate

exibility in Asia at each point in time.
In India, the rupee began its life as a `market determined ex-
change rate' in March 1993. However, this date is not identied
as a structural break by the analysis of the data. A single sub-
period of the exchange rate regime is found, from 1976 till 1998.
In this period, the rupee was de facto pegged to the dollar, with
a certain degree of exchange rate 
exibility, with an R2 of 0.84.
After the Asian crisis subsided, India embarked on a tight rupee-
dollar peg. From 28 September 1998 till 19 March 2004, the
USD coecient went back to 1.01. The other coecents were
not economically signicant. The R2 rose to 0.97. In this period,
the exchange rate regime in India was similar to that found in
China after July 2005.
In the last period, India returned to signicant exchange rate

exibility. Coecients for non-dollar currencies have started
achieving signicant values. The R2 dropped to 0.81. The
change in the exchange rate regime which took place in March
2004 was both statistically signicant and economically signi-
cant.
22Table 5 India's de facto exchange rate regime
The methodology of Zeileis et al. (2008) is applied to identifying dates of






















In the Indian case, three distinct sub-periods are visible. While the rst
and second period clearly shows pegging to the US dollar, other currencies
started mattering after March 2004. Exchange rate in
exibility is measured
by the R2 of these regressions. It shows a value of 0.81 in the third regime.
The values in brackets are standard errors.
Period USD EUR GBP JPY e R2
9 Jan '76 - 21 Aug '98 1.15 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 0.73 0.84
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
28 Sep '98 - 19 Mar '04 1.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.26 0.97
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
26 Mar '04 - 29 May '09 1.24 -0.35 -0.15 -0.05 0.77 0.81
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03)
23Table 6 China's de facto exchange rate regime
The dating methodology of Zeileis et al. (2008) reveals a series of break
dates for the Chinese exchange rate regime. However, across all these, for
all practical purposes, the Chinese exchange rate regime remains a de facto
peg to the US dollar, with near-zero exchange rate 
exibility at all times.
The values in brackets are standard errors.
Period USD EUR GBP JPY e R2
9 Jan '81 - 1 Nov '85 0.76 0.33 -0.10 -0.06 0.72 0.89
(0.13) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
8 Nov '85 - 5 Apr '91 1 0 0 0 0 1
12 Apr '91 - 19 May '95 0.97 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.29 0.97
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2 Jun '95 - 15 Jul '05 1 0 0 0 0 1
22 Jul '05 - 29 May '09 1.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.23 0.98
(0.015) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012)
24Table 6 shows the results of this estimation strategy for the
Chinese Renminbi. It nds that the rst period runs from 9
Jan 1981 till 1 November 1985. This was a period with bigger
currency 
exibility by Chinese standards; the R2 was 0.89. After
that, China has always had a tight USD peg. There are relatively
minor changes in the exchange rate regime, but it is primarily a
simple USD peg with a USD coecient of 1 and an R2  1.
In some respects, these results agree with ocial statements and
a simple visual examination of the exchange rate. The break
date of 22 July 2005 that is derived from the econometrics is
consistent with that announced by the authorities. In these
respects, the results for China help us see that the econometric
analysis is broadly on the right track.
At the same time, it is important that after 22 July 2005, no fur-
ther structural change is announced. This contradicts a variety
of ocial claims about the evolution of the exchange rate away
from dollar pegging towards a basket peg, and towards greater
exchange rate 
exibility.
The econometrics suggests that remarkably little has changed
about the actual exchange rate regime in operation when com-
pared with the previous regime. The USD coecient has dropped
to 0.949. A statistically signicant Euro coecient has emerged,
with a small value of 0.06 where the null hypothesis of 0 can be
rejected. The residual standard deviation has more than dou-
bled to 0.243. But the R2 has dropped only slightly to 0.974.
While there was more exchange rate 
exibility in this period,
the change in the exchange rate regime was extremely small.
Finally, in our third single-country example, Table 7 shows the
evolution of the exchange rate regime in Korea. From 1981 till
early 1995, Korea ran a de facto peg to the US dollar. In 1995,
a big increase in currency 
exibility came about and the R2
dropped to 0.65. This is a regime with greater 
exibility than
what is found in India.
25Figure 7 The evolution of exchange rate in
exibility in Asia
For each of the Asia-11 countries, the dating methodology of Zeileis et al.
(2008) is applied. This reveals the de facto exchange rate regime that is in
operation at all points in time. The regression R2 values across all countries
are summarised in this graph. Two location estimators, the mean and the
median, are reported. This yields a summary statement of how exchange
rate 
exibility in Asia has evolved through time.
This graph vividly shows the extreme exchange rate in
exibility in the
decade preceding the Asian crisis, which is now understood to have been a
key contributor to the crisis.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, there was greater 
exibility for a
brief period, but then `fear of 
oating' resurfaced, as was pointed out by
Calvo and Reinhart (2002b). However, this graph suggests that exchange
rate in
exibility in Asia did not go all the way back to pre-crisis levels.
While Dooley et al. (2003) have emphasised the emergence of an Asian-led
`Bretton Woods II' regime, through the last decade, exchange rate in
exi-
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26Table 7 Korea's de facto exchange rate regime
The dating methodology of Zeileis et al. (2008), applied to Korea, reveals
two periods. From 1981 till early 1995, the de facto exchange rate regime
was a pure USD peg. After that, exchange rate 
exibility has gone up
considerably; the regression R2 dropped to 0.65. The values in brackets are
standard errors.
Period USD EUR GBP JPY e R2
24 Apr '81 - 20 Jan '95 0.97 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.25 0.98
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
27 Jan '95 - 29 May '09 1.25 -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 1.12 0.65
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Figure 7 shows the average and the median value of the R2 of
the exchange rate regression for the Asia-11 countries. At each
time point, for each country, the exchange rate regime then in
operation is identied, and the R2 value from that sub-period is
utilised.
The average R2 started out at a high value of 0.9. There was
a small increase in 
exibility in 1980 and 1981. However, af-
ter that, there was a sustained period of exchange rate rigidity.
From 1982 till 1997, the average R2 was above 0.9. This in-

exibility of the exchange rate, coupled with increasing de facto
capital account openness, helped lead up to the Asian crisis,
which involved rms and banks borrowing in foreign currency
based on expectations of exchange rate rigidity.
During the Asian crisis, exchange rate 
exibility increased. In
1998, the average R2 dropped to 0.61. However, immediately
after that, exchange rate rigidity went up. This empirical fact
was brought to prominence by Calvo and Reinhart (2002b), who
emphasised that after the Asian crisis, little had changed with
exchange rate regimes in Asia. This perspective was further
amplied by the `Bretton Woods II' hypothesis, which tried to
rationalise this exchange rate rigidity (Dooley et al., 2003).
27Our evidence oers a somewhat dierent perspective in two re-
spects. First, while the exchange rate in
exibility of Asia-11 rose
after the crisis subsided, it went back up to lower values when
compared with what prevailed before the crisis. The mean R2
was 0.93 in 1997. Post-crisis, this went back up to 0.88 over the
2002-2004 period.
The second interesting observation is that from 2002 onwards,
the exchange rate 
exibility of Asia-11 has been slowly rising.
The mean R2 dropped slightly from the value of 0.886 which
reigned from 2002-2004 to 0.85 in 2009. This suggests that while
Asia-11 continues to have considerable exchange rate in
exibil-
ity, there is some evidence of gradual movement towards greater

exibility. With an average value of 0.85 in 2009, the environ-
ment has changed when compared with the average value of 0.93
in 1997.
4 Policy analysis
Table 8 summarises where Asia stands in terms of the choice of
the exchange rate regime and capital account openness. There
are two important perspectives on this situation: the distinction
between de jure and de facto capital account restrictions, and
the extent to which monetary policy autonomy is ceded.
4.1 Asia and the impossible trinity
The `impossible trinity' is the assertion that a country can only
have two of three things: exchange rate setting, capital account
openness and monetary policy autonomy. In the extreme, a
country with a completely open capital account and a completely
xed exchange rate has no monetary policy autonomy.2 In the
2In a recent paper, Aizenman et al. (2008) nd empirical support for
the impossible trinity.
28Table 8 Asia and the impossible trinity
This table summarises key results for the Asia-11. It shows the status of
the Asia-11 countries in the most recent observed year.
The exchange rate in
exibility, observed for 2009, draws on the methodol-
ogy of Section 3.1. The Chinn-Ito database is used for measurement of de
jure capital controls prevalent in 2007. The Lane Milesi-Feretti measure is
used for measurement of de facto capital account openness in 2007.
Exchange rate Capital account openness
Country in
exibility De jure De facto
(2009) (2007) (2007)
China 0.98 -1.13 1.13
Hong Kong 1.00 2.53 23.91
India 0.81 -1.13 0.71
Indonesia 0.68 1.18 0.87
Korea 0.65 0.18 1.35
Malaysia 0.92 -0.09 2.22
Philippines 0.78 0.14 1.32
Singapore 0.93 2.53 10.39
Taiwan 0.90 N.A. 3.37
Thailand 0.83 -1.13 1.42
Vietnam 0.87 -1.13 1.30
Mean 0.85 0.195 4.08
Median 0.87 0.025 1.58
29typical Asian setting, increasing de facto openness has come
about through a combination of de jure liberalisation coupled
with domestic nancial sector development, and the evasion of
capital controls that become possible with a large current ac-
count. Under these conditions, exchange rate in
exibility can
lead to distortions of monetary policy. Even though a country
might try to regain monetary policy autonomy through nan-
cial repression, intensied implementation of capital controls, or
sterilisation, the logic of the impossible trinity suggests that ex-
change rate pegging comes at the cost of autonomy in monetary
policy.
Of particular importance in an emerging market setting is the
procyclicality of capital 
ows. When times are good, business
cycle conditions are buoyant, capital tends to come into the
country. If exchange rate appreciation is prevented by the cen-
tral bank, this requires buying dollars which ultimately leads
to lowered domestic interest rates. Conversely, when times are
hard in a business cycle downturn, capital tends to leave the
country. When the central bank combats this by selling dollars,
this ultimately leads to higher domestic interest rates. The pro-
cyclicality of capital 
ows interacts with exchange rate pegging
to induce procyclicality of monetary policy. This is the specic
sense, in an emerging market setting, in which monetary policy
is distorted.
The status of Asia on the two policy choices of the impossible
trinity is diverse with economies with high capital account open-
ness and low or no exchange rate 
exibility (Singapore, Hong
Kong)and economies that have low capital account openness
and in
exible exchange rates (China, India).
In terms of the direction of movement from 2000 to 2008, all
the countries have moved towards greater de facto openness,
other than Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Exchange
rate 
exibility went down for Indonesia, was unchanged for most
countries, and went up for Malaysia, India and slightly for China.
30In the impossible trinity framework a country could have a xed
exchange rate and give up independent monetary policy. This
would be consistent with the framework. Open capital account
with xed exchange rate leads to loss of monetary policy au-
tonomy, as has been experienced in Hong Kong. The currency
board of Hong Kong is a consistent monetary policy framework,
where domestic interest rates 
uctuate as a side eect of the
exchange rate peg.
Floating exchange rate with open capital account is also well
understood. Countries with 
oating exchange rates turn out
to have an R2 in the exchange rate regression of 0.4 to 0.5.
These countries are able to achieve open capital accounts and
monetary policy autonomy. The Asian country which is closest
to that zone is Korea, and the country which has made the
biggest movement towards that was India.
The interesting questions lie with those economies with low cap-
ital account openness and in
exible exchange rates. If a country
had an in
exible exchange rate and a de factoclosed capital ac-
count { with gross 
ows on the BOP of well below 40% of GDP {
then it could obtain monetary policy autonomy. As an example,
in the late 1980s, India appears to have enjoyed monetary policy
autonomy, where exchange rate in
exibility was combined with
gross 
ows to GDP of roughly 25%. In either 2000 or in 2008,
none of the Asia-11 countries occupy that region of the graph.
The country closest to this arrangement in 2008 is China, which
is attempting to have negligible exchange rate 
exibility while
having considerable capital account openness. It is hence of
considerable importance to ask the question: Has China been
able to preserve monetary policy autonomy?
Many authors have examined the details of Chinese monetary
policy, with a focus on issues such as mechanisms of sterilisa-
tion, measurement of sterilisation coecients, and the interplay
between sterilisation and the banking system. In our treatment,
we treat all these as intermediate factors that in
uence the end
31outcome of monetary policy: the short-term interest rate of the
economy. In order to understand the extent to which monetary
policy has been pro-cyclical, it is not essential to examine these
intermediate features. Instead, we re-express the short-term in-
terest rate in China in real terms, and juxtapose it against busi-
ness cycle conditions. This allows us to assess the extent to
which interest rates were high in a business cycle expansion and
vice versa, or whether such counter-cyclicality of monetary pol-
icy failed to arise.
Figure 8 examines the extent to which monetary policy in China
became procyclical in the recent business cycle expansion. In the
gure, the time-series of quarterly GDP growth measures Chi-
nese business cycle conditions. This shows an enormous boom
in GDP growth from 2002 onwards till 2007. Juxtaposing this
against the 90-day treasury bill rate (expressed in real terms),
we see that from 2002 till early 2008, the real rate dropped by
an enormous 800 basis points. This suggests that in good times,
monetary policy was expansionary. This is consistent with the
idea that exchange rate pegging converts the pro-cyclicality of
capital 
ows into pro-cyclicality of monetary policy. The use of
loose monetary policy at a time of an unprecedented business
cycle expansion, in both countries, helped induce an acceleration
of in
ation and an asset price boom.
This 800 basis point decline in the real rate, in an unprece-
dented business cycle expansion, suggests that China was not
able to avoid the impossible trinity through sterilised interven-
tion or other techniques based on either capital controls or -
nancial repression. While a wide variety of these measures were
attempted, they did not avoid the ultimate outcome: the only
way to obtain the pegged exchange rate was to have a very low
interest rate in real terms.
A similar analysis can be conducted for India, with similar re-
sults. Even though India had more exchange rate 
exibility than
China, monetary policy was ultimately forced to yield negative
32Figure 8 Chinese monetary policy and the Chinese business
cycle
The time-series of Chinese quarterly GDP growth is used as a measure of
business cycle conditions. The short-term nominal rate of the economy is
re-expressed in real terms using current in
ation rates, to obtain the time-
series of the real rate. The broad picture is one where the real rates attained
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33real rates in the expansion and switch around to positive real
rates in the downturn.3 China and India are in the best po-
sition, in Asia, to try to preserve monetary policy autonomy
despite having exchange rate in
exibility, given relatively mod-
est values of de facto openness and a poorly developed domestic
nancial system. However, the evidence suggests that even in
these two countries, exchange rate pegging resulted in procycli-
cality of monetary policy.
The constraints of the impossible trinity are likely to be even
more acute in Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand, all of which have
more de facto openness than China and India, better developed
nancial systems than China or India but have less exchange
rate 
exibility than India.
Among Asian Economies, Korea has made the most progress
towards the mainstream conguration of industrial countries,
where the capital account is open and the exchange rate 
oats.
Korea has high capital account openness, and the most 
exi-
ble exchange rate in Asia. It has made considerable progress
on establishing the institutional capability of a central bank.
However, the Korean exchange rate regime, with an R2 of 0.65,
lags the 
exibility seen with 
oating rates where the R2 attains
values of 0.4 to 0.5
Financial sector development and de facto openness in the Philip-
pines and Indonesia are low. Hence, in principle, these countries
could possibly have chosen to have exchange rate pegging and
try to not lose monetary policy autonomy. Among the Asia-11
countries, these are the two countries where it can most be at-
tempted, where the monetary policy distortions associated with
exchange rate in
exibility would be the lowest. Despite this,
these countries have chosen to have considerable exchange rate

exibility.
3For a detailed analysis of the procyclicality of monetary policy in India,
see Patnaik and Shah (2009); Bhattacharya et al. (2008); Patnaik (2007).
345 Choice of regime
The rationale for the choice of a tight peg in contrast to a more

exible rate can be many. First, the central bank may try to
prevent depreciation in the context of high exchange rate pass
through to keep in
ation under control. Alternatively, if a large
number of rms have large dollar borrowings, the problem of the
'original sin', the central bank may try to prevent large depre-
ciations to protect the balance sheet of these companies. Under
such conditions, the central bank may lean against the wind
when there is downward pressure on the exchange rate and pre-
vent depreciation by selling foreign exchange reserves.
Similary, in a dierent context central banks may prevent appre-
ciation of the currency. Capital in
ows to emerging economies
since the early 2000s have put pressure on their exchange rates
to appreciate. During this period some emerging economies,
such as countries in Asia, have, been pursuing policies of export
led growth(Rodrik, 2007). Allowing the exchange rate to appre-
ciate can put at risk a country's policy of promoting export led
growth through an undervalued exchange rate. The exchange
rate regimes of most emerging markets in this period have been
de jure managed 
oats. Thus, these countries intervene in for-
eign exchange markets to prevent appreciation of the exchange
rate. Ramachandran and Srinivasan (2007); Pontines and Ra-
jan (2008) nd evidence to support the hypothesis that Asian
countries have intevened in foreign exchange market to prevent
currency appreciation. The rationale for doing so may lie in the
large share of exports to GDP in many of these economies.
6 Conclusion
The main argument of this paper is that it is more important
to avoid an inconsistent monetary policy framework than it is
35to avoid capital account liberalisation. While Asia has avoided
de jure capital account liberalisation, integration into the world
economy has continued, de facto.
Asia-11 countries have moved forward on a program of domestic
nancial sector liberalisation. The average value of the Dorrucci
et al. (2009) measure of domestic nancial system capability
went up from a low point of 0.45 in 2000 to 0.51 in 2006. The
eectiveness of capital controls is diminished when the nancial
system is sophisticated, and growing current account integration
gives economic agents the opportunity to engage in illegal trans-
fers of capital. All countries increased de facto capital account
openness from 2000 to 2008, other than Indonesia, Philippines
and Malaysia.
Increasing de facto integration poses questions about the evolu-
tion of the exchange rate regime. Figure 7 shows that on average,
Asian exchange rate regimes have moved towards greater 
ex-
ibility when compared with the `fear of 
oating' period which
came immediately after the Asian crisis. At the same time, the
de facto arrangement shows considerable exchange rate pegging.
None of the Asia-11 countries is a 
oating exchange rate. The
country with the most exchange rate 
exibility { Korea { is not
yet at a 
oating rate. From 2000 to 2008, Malaysia and In-
dia moved towards greater 
exibility, and China moved towards
slightly more 
exibility. Apart from this, Asia-11 largely ap-
pears to be on a trajectory with increasing de facto openness
and a lack of reform of the monetary policy regime.
The approach of deepening de facto capital account openness,
coupled with exchange rate rigidity, has two consequences:
 Central banks seeking exchange rate rigidity could have to
distort the policy rate in order to achieve exchange rate
targets. To the extent that capital 
ows are procyclical,
exchange rate pegging would generate procyclical mone-
tary policy. A key observation of this paper lies in the
extent of procyclicality of China and India, the countries
36with lower nancial system capability and lower de facto
openness than most of Asia. If these countries are unable
to avoid procyclical monetary policy when implementing
exchange rate in
exibility, then these problems would be
present in other Asian countries to a greater extent.
 Systemic crises could also arise. Asian countries continue
to experience dogghts between speculators and central
banks, problems with unhedged foreign currency borrow-
ing by corporations, and other consequences of an incon-
sistent monetary policy regime. Bigger problems in the
future cannot be ruled out, particularly in Malaysia and
Taiwan where there is an awkward combination of (a) con-
siderable de facto openness, (b) sophisticated domestic -
nancial systems and (c) exchange rate in
exibility compa-
rable to that of China.
From the viewpoint of systemic crises, the key source of prob-
lems lies in households, banks and corporations which count on
exchange rate rigidity. When it is felt that exchange rate 
uctu-
ations will not take place, substantial exchange rate exposures
build up. This leads to diculties when large exchange rate
movements take place. Hence, the rst stages of reform should
emphasise exchange rate 
exibility and the development of cur-
rency derivatives markets. Exchange rate 
exibility would give
economic agents the incentive to do risk management, and cur-
rency derivatives markets would give them the ability to execute
desired trades. Asia is, by and large, disregarding this wisdom
on sequencing, by moving forward on de facto capital account
openness before bringing in the currency 
exibility.
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40A Appendix: Exchange rate regime
analysis
In the main text of the paper, we have shown the results for three
countries, namely India, China and Korea. Results for the remaining
8 countries are in this appendix.
A.1 Hong Kong
start end r2 US DUR GBP JPY Variance
1991-01-11 1995-01-20 1.00 1.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01
75.38 -2.38 0.39 -0.88
1995-01-27 2000-12-15 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
441.65 0.25 0.92 3.83
2000-12-22 2003-09-19 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
1822.53 0.96 0.10 -0.10
2003-09-26 2009-05-29 1.00 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
218.94 1.33 0.01 2.54
A.2 Indonesia
start end r2 USD DUR GBP JPY Variance
1991-11-15 1997-07-11 0.98 1.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.05
35.03 0.15 -1.65 -1.23
1997-07-18 2001-11-09 0.16 1.10 -0.22 0.00 -0.13 12.68
4.40 -2.12 0.01 -0.87
2001-11-16 2009-05-29 0.68 1.35 -0.32 -0.14 -0.08 1.55
22.72 -2.79 -2.33 -1.57
41A.3 Philippines
start end r2 USD DUR GBP JPY Variance
1991-11-15 1995-12-29 0.65 0.86 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 1.49
4.64 0.73 -0.24 -0.49
1996-01-05 1997-07-04 1.00 1.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
49.36 0.69 -1.82 -2.23
1997-07-11 1998-11-20 0.30 -1.14 0.83 0.27 -0.45 4.63
-1.94 2.67 0.91 -3.89
1998-11-27 2009-05-29 0.78 1.12 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.69
33.29 -0.51 -2.40 -0.83
42A.4 Singapore
start end r2 USD DUR GBP JPY Variance
1991-01-11 1997-07-11 0.94 0.98 -0.12 0.02 0.10 0.11
23.26 -5.58 1.09 6.47
1997-07-18 1999-01-08 0.31 0.17 -0.04 0.44 0.21 1.52
0.98 -1.15 2.33 3.07
1999-01-15 2009-05-29 0.84 0.63 0.26 0.08 0.09 0.25
31.39 6.80 3.83 5.92
A.5 Thailand
start end r2 USD DUR GBP JPY Variance
1991-01-11 1997-05-16 0.99 1.02 -0.09 0.01 0.07 0.02
65.31 -11.39 1.18 12.36
1997-05-23 1998-09-25 0.06 0.73 -0.42 -0.01 0.21 4.82
0.98 -1.16 -0.03 1.06
1998-10-02 2009-05-29 0.67 0.71 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.81
20.53 3.87 2.31 4.75
A.6 Taiwan
start end r2 USD DUR GBP JPY Variance
1991-01-11 1997-07-25 0.93 1.02 -0.07 0.03 0.05 0.17
20.24 -2.82 1.49 2.52
1997-08-01 1998-10-30 0.35 0.90 -0.26 0.20 0.23 1.32
2.29 -1.38 1.21 3.68
1998-11-06 2009-05-29 0.86 0.77 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.29
35.75 1.09 5.40 3.55
43